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NOTES
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT ITS APPLICATION
TO THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER
In the 180 year span of industrial development since the advent of
the steam driven mill, perhaps the single unifying element permeating
American commerce has been its continued and accelerating growth.
Apparent from every economic mdex-aggregate production, annual
revenues, net corporate worth, capital reserves-this phenomenal growth
is most dramatically demonstrated by the 1970 Gross National Product
of one trillion dollars, a 100 percent increase over that of 1960.1 Con-
comitant with this national economic growth has been the tremendous
accretion in size and power of the leading corporate firms. This con-
centration of wealth in the leading corporations is itself a response of
American business to an era of unprecedented prosperity-prosperity
created by cumulative progress in production technology The process
is circular; larger firms are able to allocate greater capital sums to
research and development, leading to refinements in production methods
which increase efficiency in consumption of base resources, increasing
aggregate production and hence gross revenues, a portion of which can
then be deployed for further research and development. It is there-
fore apparent that at least in the major progressive industries optimum
size .of a firm is of critical significance.
A corporation desiring to expand its operation has two available
alternatives: internal expansion, which involves construction of new
production facilities, financed either by existing capital reserves or
more commonly through some form of deficit funding such as a bond
or debenture issue, or merger, i.e. the acquisition of another existing
enterprise by the purchase of its stock or assets. There are several
legitimate reasons for a growth-oriented firm to prefer the acquisition
route over internal expansion. The target firm may hold patents neces-
sary to the proposed production mode. Its -established market position
and good will may facilitate the conversion. In the fast developing
industries such as electronics and organic plastics there may be a con-
siderable lead time advantage in the acquisition of an operatmg concern.
Moreover from the standpoint of financing the expansion, high com-
mercial interest rates or a shortage of capital reserves may favor a
1. TE WoRLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS (1971).
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trade-off of existing -equities as opposed to an expenditure of "new"
capital.
There is one clear hazard to the acquisition method of corporate
expansion not shared by the internal method. In 1914 Congress en-
acted the Clayton Act,2 section 7 of which generally prohibited the
acquisition by a corporation of stock in another corporation where the
effect of the acquisition may be to lessen competition.3 This section was
amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act4 in 1950 so that now any acquisi-
tion of stock or assets of another corporation is unlawful where the
effect may be substantially to lessen competition in any industry in any
region of the country." The breadth and scope of the statute, apparent
from its general wording, have greatly hampered the accurate predic-
tion of the legality of proposed mergers. This note will deal with
the problem of uncertainty in the enforcement of section 7 through an
analysis of the elements of the statute and its application-particularly
to conglomerate mergers-and a discussion of the relevant economic
policy considerations.
THE STATUTE
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, provides in perti-
nent part that
[n]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."
Commerce is defined as "trade or commerce among the several
States and with foreign nations . .. ," providing the basis for federal
jurisdiction. Since the concept of interstate commerce has been ex-
tended to its logical limit by judicial decision,8 the overwhelming ma-
2. 15 U.S.C. H 12-15, 18-22,27,44 (1946); 29 U.S.C. S§ 52,53 (1946).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946).
4. 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1970).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. S 12 (1970).
8. Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 US. 219 (1948).
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jority of corporations, even those carrying no out-of-stare accounts, are
at least conceivably subject to section 7 control. For this reason, the
parameters of the statute's operation are critical to a corporation con-
templating a merger.
The scope of section 7 can best be analyzed by discussion of judicial
interpretation regarding each of its component parts.
Type of Enterprise Affected
It should be noted at the outset that section 7 extends only to a
corporation acquiring the stock or assets of another corporation. Hence
it would seem that a partnership or sole proprietorship could safely
acquire corporate stock or assets without fear of a section 7 violation,
and similarly a corporation could acquire partnership assets. This
apparent loophole is of small consequence, however, as a partnership
or sole proprietorship is seldom if ever of sufficient size to be a cynosure
of federal antitrust enforcementY
Acquisition of Stock or Assets
For over half a decade the phrase "no corporation ... shall acquire"
was interpreted by the business community to operate only against pend-
ing mergers. This interpretation was rendered nugatory in 1957 when
in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.10 the Supreme
Court held that the 40 years' previous acquisition by du Pont of 23
percent of General Motors stock had blossomed into a section 7 vio-
lation.11 The Court further directed that du Pont be ordered to divest
itself of the shares."2 Hence no acquisition could ever become free from
potential reversal under section 7, regardless of the elapsed time and
the consequent hardship of a divestiture.
The du Pont holding created alarm in corporate circles for quite
another reason. Section 7 had previously been construed to bar only
horizontal mergers, i.e. those between competitors in the same market.
Du Pont, however, involved the acquisition by a supplier (of automobile
seat cover fabric), of stock in a purchasing corporation, the classic
9. It should be observed that section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38
Star. 717 (1914) may operate to seal this loophole. Section 5 prohibits any unfair method
of competition, and was held to bar an acquisition by a dairy association in Beatrice
Foods Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 17,244 (FTC DKT. 6653, 1965).
10. 353 US. 586 (1957).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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vertical acquisition."8 By thus extending the scope of the statute, the
Court cleared the way for the future mobilization of section 7 against
conglomerate acquisitions, leaving no major merger secure against po-
tential section 7 attack.
Prior to the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment, section 7 by its terms
operated only against acquisition of stock of another corporation."
Owing to this limitation, in circumstances that would prevent a cor-
poration legally from acquiring the stock of another, the same result
could be accomplished by a liquidation and purchase of the target cor-
poration's assets, in return for a redemption of its outstanding shares.
The amendment foreclosed this method of short-circuiting section 7,
by providing that "no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets" '" of another corporation where a substantial lessening of com-
petition may result. Although the terms of the amendment appear to
limit its application to FTC-regulated corporations, it was held to in-
validate a proposed bank merger,'6 notwithstanding the merger was to
be effectuated through a sale of assets,17 and notwithstanding banking is
expressly exempt from FTC regulation under section 5 of the FTC
Act.'" The Court justified this -extension of the application of section 7
by a finding that the purpose of the 1950 amendment was to reach all
mergers, whether by stock or asset acquisition, and hence the "excep-
tion for acquiring corporations not subject to the FTC's jurisdiction
excludes from the coverage of § 7 only assets acquisitions by such
corporations when not accomplished by merger." 19 [Emphasis sup-
plied]. It is safe to assume that this rule will be extended to other
FTC-exempt industries such as common carriers and certain meat
packers.20 Hence the exception for mergers involving non-FTC-regu-
lated corporations has been effectively expunged from the amendment,
despite the obvious intent of Congress to vest authority to control
asset acquisitions in these industries in the appropriate regulatory body.
Insofar as concerns the definition of "assets" within the statute, the
term is sufficiently broad to include "property or property rights,
13. Id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
16. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
17. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (6) (1970).
19. 374 U.S. at 342.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1970).
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real or personal, tangible or intangible, which are subj'ect to transfer
and which have been used by the seller and could be used by the buyer
competitively." 21 Thus cstomer lists, 22 exclusive licenses,2 3 trademarks
and patents24 have been found to be assets within the purview of
section 7.
Relevant Market
The act provides that an acquisition is unlawful where the effect
may be substantially to lessen competition "in any line of commerce
in any section of the country ... ,, 25 Therefore to establish a vio-
lation, it is necessary to demonstrate the probable effect of the acquisi-
tion in two market dimensions-the product market or line of com-
merce, and the geographic market or section of the country.
The statute lends no assistance in defining the limits of the relevant
market, but they have been generally held coterminous with the "area
of effective competition." 26 Such a definition is of course patently
circular, yielding the analytic proposition that an acquisition which
restrains trade in the "area of effective competition" thereby lessens
competition in the relevant market. This circularity endows the rele-
vant market requirement with a remarkable accordian-like flexibility,
allowing courts to extend or compress the bounds of the statutory rele-
vant market to coincide with any "market" shown to be affected. As
a result, the market provision of section 7 has been substantially
vitiated. 7
A sampling of section 7 decisions will illustrate this point. Relevant
geographic markets have been found to b'e as large as the entire coun-
try, or as small as a single metropolis.29 In regard to the product
market, its flexibility is demonstrated by the observations of Chief
Justice Warren in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States:30
21. CCH TRADE REr. REP. 4259 (FTC DKT. 6388).
22. Id. ,
23. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 1960 TRADE CASES 69-766 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
24. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
26. Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1948).
27. Cf. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (Harlan, J..dis-
senting).
28. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S., 540 (1966).
29. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
30. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). -
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The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of de-
mand between the product itself and substitutes for it. However,
within this broad market, well-defined submarkets exist which, in
themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes."'
Thus in a later decision a can manufacturer was prohibited from ac-
quiring a bottle manufacturer because their products were in competi-
tion in certain "end use" markets, such as the beer container industry. 2
The objective of the Government in a section 7 case is therefore
to define the relevant product and geographic markets sufficiently broad
to include the products of both acquiring and acquired firms, yet not
so broad as to reduce their respective market percentages to an insig-
nificant figure. By mastering this feat of economic legerdemain the
Government has been able to compile an impressive record of section 7
victories. 8
The Effect May Be Substantially to Lessen Competition
As is plain from the language of this clause, the thrust of section 7
is preventive and not remedial. Its purpose is to reverse potential re-
straints of trade in their incipiency, and thereby avert the often disas-
trous consequences of dismantling a fully-integrated acquisition. Ac-
cordingly, it has been held that the Government need not establish the
certainty that a restraint of trade will result from a given acquisition,
but only a "reasonable probability" that such will be the effect."
Perhaps the most troublesome element of the statute has been the
requirement of a "substantial" lessening of competition. Initially, the
test for measuring the degree of anticompetitive effect depends upon
the type of merger involved. Thus the legality of a horizontal merger
will hinge on the resultant increase in market power of the merged
firm, whereas in the case of a vertical merger, the standard criterion is
the degree of foreclosure to competitors of the market of the acquired
firm. Most conglomerate mergers have horizontal or vertical com-
ponents, and to that extent are treated as horizontal or vertical mergers
31. ld. at 325.
32. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
33. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 at 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.
dissenting): "The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under 5 7 the
Government always wins."
34. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp, 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
[Vol. 13;623
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
when measuring their anticompetitive effects. The pure conglomerate
or diversification merger cannot be indexed on a straight market per-
centage basis-the standards for determining its legality are discussed in
detail in the following section.
Within these indices of measurement, the term "substantially" has
been variously interpreted. Several decisions illustrate the extreme lim-
its of its definition. As respects horizontal mergers, the Supreme Court
has intimated in United States v. Pabst Bre'wing Co.u that a merger of
two breweries supplying an aggregated 4.49 percent of the national
beer market would result in a substantial lessening of competition in
that market. 36 A trend toward increased concentration was detected,
rendering the market more sensitive to further horizontal amalgama-
tion.37
The Court has held that a vertical merger which would foreclose
one percent of the acquired firm's market would substantially lessen
competition in a market characterized by vertical integration.8
A strict interpretation of the term "to lessen" would require proof of
probable diminution of existing competition in order to establish a
section 7 violation. Nevertheless, a joint venture between a non-pro-
ducer and an existing seller in the southeastern sodium chlorate market
was invalidated on the basis that the non-producer was a "potential
entrant" into the market via internal growth.39 Apparently a merger
is vulnerable to section 7 attack whenever a commensurate market entry
through internal expansion was contemplated and would have increased
competition in that market. Accordingly, "to lessen" should be read as
"to prevent from increasing" competition.
It should be noted that certain stock acquisitions by their nature
have no effect whatsoever upon competition, and these acquisitions are
-expressly allowed. ° An example of this type of acquisition is the pur-
chase of non-voting preferred stock in another corporation for capital
investment purposes. Since the acquiring firm gains no control over
the management of the corporation in which it has acquired the stock,
it is obvious that no anticompetitive effect can result.
Finally, section 7 proscribes not only those acquisitions which may
substantially lessen competition, but also those tending to create a
35. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294 (1962).
39. United States vI. Penn-Olin Chemical Co, 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
40. 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1970).
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monopoly.41 It would appear that tendency to create a monopoly
would be subsumed under the broader probability of lessening of com-
petition, but there may arise certain cases, particularly with regard to
vertical mergers or patent acquisitions, where problems of proof may
favor the allegation of a tendency toward monopoly.
APPLICATION OF SECTION 7 TO THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER
Soon after the enactment of section 7 in 1914, it became evident that
any major horizontal merger would be blocked due to the resulting
increase in market dominance. In 1957, the du Pont-GM decision
foreshadowed a similar crackdown on sizable vertical mergers. In an
attempt to 'evade section 7 application, firms bent on acquisition began
to diversify, resulting in a significant increase in the number of con-
glomerate mergers during the 1960-69 decade.42 However the statute
again proved sufficiently ductile to adapt to the task, as the Government
was able to establish several various means whereby a conglomerate
merger could lessen competition.
Before exploring these potential restraints, it is necessary to isolate
and define the diverse types of acquisition encompassed by the term
"Cconglomerate merger." In its broad sense the term denotes a residuary
category--iz., all mergers that are neither horizontal nor vertical. Three
distinct classes of merger fall within this category. The product 'ex-
tension merger involves the acquisition of a firm producing a product
related to, but not in competition with, a product of the acquiring firm.
Bases for the desirability of this type of merger may include similarities
in production or marketing methods of the two products, or product
complement.
A market extension merger results from the acquisition of a firm
selling the same product as that of the acquiring firm, but in another
geographic market, so that the two firms are not in competition. The
advantages are obvious-the acquiring firm is experienced in handling
the product; personnel and positions may be readily interlocked; in-
ventory, credit, and accounting loads can be pooled, etc.
The third class is the pure conglomerate, or diversification merger,
wherein a corporation acquires another firm producing a product
totally unrelated in all aspects to that produced by the acquiring firm.
An example of such a merger is the acquisition by a steel producer of
41. Id.
42. MAmRCaRs AND ACQUISITONS, vol. 6/3 at 15, table 5 (Fall 1971).
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a retail clothing chain. About the only conceivable advantage to be
obtained by this type of merger, aside from its relative safety from
section 7 attack, is the distribution of risk of capital loss.43 The former
can* hardly be classed as a positive advantage, however, since many
corporate activities, such as divisional spin-off, debt reorganization,
internal expansion, or liquidation of assets, similarly involve a negligible
risk of section 7 interference.
These three classes of conglomerate merger are susceptible in vary-
ing degrees to section 7 regulation under a number of theories, each of
which purports to describe a type of trade restraint. A discussion of
each of these theories follows, with an analysis of its validity and appli-
cation in relation to its particular economic matrix.
Redefinition of Product Line
Continental Can demonstrated that by manipulating the lines of dis-
tinction between related products, a product extension merger could
be suffused with a sufficiently horizontal taint to construe a lessening of
competition. Thus it was found that metal and glass containers were
substitute products in certain industries, and that "interindustry com-
petition between glass and metal containers is sufficient to warrant
treating as a relevant product market the combined glass and metal
container industries and all end uses for which they compete." 4
The extent to which this rule of product interchangeability will be
projected is as yet problematic. Many diverse products have potentially
interrelated uses. Carrying this line of reasoning to its reductio ad
absurdum, a drastic increase in the price of hammers could conceiv-
ably lead to the use of baseball bats to drive nails. This hypothetical
conjunction of end uses, however, should obviously not prevent a
forging company from acquiring a manufacturer of baseball bats. It
is safe to conclude that a high degree of cross-elasticity of demand
between the two products will probably lead to the finding of a hybrid
market. The difficulty will arise in determining the point at which the
degree of product interchangeability is no longer sufficiently high to
place the products of the two firms in a competing market.
43. S. F. Reed deprecatingly refers to the ,pure, conglomerate form of merger as an
"agglomerate," possessing none of the integrative qualities' of the other, types of merger.
S. Reed, Corporate Diversification: A Logical Approach, MERGEs AND AcorsmoNs,
vol. , /4-at 4 (July-Aug. 1970).
44. 378 U.S. at 457.
1972.]! -
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Potential Entrant
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.45 an acquisition by a
firm outside the acquired firm's market was found violative of section
7 where the acquiring firm would probably have otherwise entered
the market by internal expansion.46 Two justifications are advanced for
this rule: 1) the acquisition removes the threat of a new market en-
trant, which is an effective stimulant to competition, particularly in an
oligopolistic market, and 2) it lessens future competition, i.e. prevents
an increase in competition, as previously noted, by eliminating the
potential entrant as a future competitor in its own right through in-
ternal expansion.42
The primary utility of the potential entrant rule is obviously in
blocking a market extension merger, such as was contemplated in El
Paso Natural Gas Co. Nonetheless the rule could easily be extrapolated
to bar a pure conglomerate merger where the requisite intent of the
acquiring firm to -enter the market of the acquired firm by any means
could be established; a non-producer planning to enter the market is as
viable a force on existing competition as an outside producer consider-
ing entry.
It should be emphasized that the validity of the potential entrant
rule demands a showing that the acquiring firm was, but for the acqui-
sition, a probable entrant via internal growth.48 Otherwise virtually all
conglomerate mergers could be blocked by the rule, since an acquisition
in itself indicates an interest in the market of the acquired firm. Apro-
pos of this requirement, a district court has recently held that minutes
of the board of directors of an acquiring firm in a market extension
merger, which minutes stated that the firm would enter the New Eng-
land beer market only if it could acquire an established producer in
the market, constituted a sufficient showing of lack of probable inde-
pendent entry.49 This finding is perhaps a bit too credulous to be prac-
tical; if the decision survives appeal, the potential entrant rule could
b-e effectively negated by the simple procedure of drafting the minutes
against future antitrust litigation.
45. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
46. Id.
47. E.g., Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates, and Oligopolies: A Widening of
Antitrust Targets, 21 RurnaRs L. REv. 187 (1967).
48. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 1313 (1965).
49. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 534 A.T.R.R. D-1, - F. Supp. -
(D.R.I. 1971).
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Reciprocal Trading and Related Problems
There is some argument that section 7 should operate to prevent
conglomerate acquisition where there is a danger that the resulting
firm may exploit its diversity to promote reciprocal trade, tying arrange-
ments, or some other form of exclusive dealing agreement with other
firms which deal with one of its divisions.50 This danger is most preva-
lent in the case of a "broken" vertical merger, i.e. a conglomerate
acquisition wherein one firm acquires another firm one step removed in
the production chain, so that firms in the middle are in a position to buy
from one division of the conglomerate and sell to another. Such an
arrangement is obviously fertile ground for reciprocal dealings, and was
the basis, in Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,5 '
for invalidation of the acquisition by a food retailer of an onion-garlic
producer.
In Consolidated Foods, however, there was evidence of actual recipro-
cal trade agreements, wherein food processors who sold to Consolidated
agreed to buy from its newly-acquired onion-garlic division.52 Since
such agreements have been held illegal under the Sherman Act,53 there
is no logical necessity for section 7 application.r It is doubtful that the
statute was intended to be employed as a panacea to prevent all mergers
which enable a substantive antitrust violation. Such a broad construc-
tion of section 7 is analogous to construing the hiring of an adolescent
cashier as "contributing to the delinquency of a minor," since the
minor is thereby placed in a position to defalcate.
Furthermore, the same net result could be accomplished by internal
expansion, i.e. the firm could construct a production unit which would
enable it to buy from and sell to the same party. It appears somewhat
ludicrous to prohibit an acquisition on the basis of an effect which could
lawfully be accomplished by internal growth.
-In summary, it seems that the possibility of reciprocal trade or simi-
lar agreements is a defensible bar to a conglomerate acquisition only
where it is proved that such is a probable consequence.55 The proof
could include past behavior of the firms, market exigencies, etc.
50. E.g., Whitney, supra note 47.
51. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
52. Id.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1970).
54. United States v. General Dynamics Corp, 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
55. Turner, supra note 48.
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The "Deep Pocket" Doctrine
This theory generally holds that a conglomerate is in a position to
offset losses in one division with profits from another. It is thereby able
to sell below cost for sustained periods of time, and by so doing drive
out the small single-line competitors."6
The deep pocket doctrine suffers from the same logical defects in-
herent in the reciprocal trade theory. Such predatory pricing as the
doctrine anticipates is an unfair trade practice, and hence subject to
control under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.5 7 More-
over, again the firm could enter the market through internal expansion
and present the same "deep pocket" threats. In short, section 7 appears
to be an improper instrument for concluding the possibility of preda-
tory pricing.58
Entrenchment of Market Power
In Federal Trade Commission v. The Procter & Gamble Co.,59 a
product extension merger between Procter & Gamble, a large soap
manufacturer, and Clorox, the largest producer of liquid household
bleach, was prohibited on the basis that Procter's enormous marketing
and advertising power would solidify Clorox's already dominant posi-
tion in the household bleach market.60 Thus a new facet was added to
the array of section 7-the acquisition by an inordinately large corpora-
tion of a firm in an oligopolistic market could be blocked as a potential
trade restraint.
Reasons advanced for this rule are that the resultant market power
of the merged firm, particularly in a concentrated industry, would dis-
courage new entry, and possibly intimidate smaller competitors from
engaging in price competition for fear of retaliatory price cuts.6I' Such
reasons appear valid, but as with reciprocal trade dangers, it would seem
that the Government should be held to the burden of proving the
probability of the aforementioned restrictive effects in order to defeat a
proposed acquisition.
56. Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315 (D.C. Ill.
1965).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
58. Turner, supra note 48.
59. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
60. Id.
61. Turner, supra note 48; Whitney, supra note 47.
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Economies of Scale
Finally, it has been claimed that the sheer size of a large conglom-
erate operation provides certain economies of advertising, marketing,
distribution, and accounting costs not shared by smaller competitors.
Most commentators agree, however, that these economies of scale should
not in themselves invalidate an otherwise lawful merger, 2 for to allow
such a result would be tantamount to subsidizing inefficiency. Further-
more, any unfair price or service advantage obtained through size
alone would constitute an illegal price discrimination under the Robin-
son-Patman Act,63 obviating the necessity for the more stringent section
7 remedy.
The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
In May, 1968 the Department of Justice promulgated a set of guide-
lines" for the avowed purpose of informing the interested public as
to the types of mergers which would be challenged. Such information
should be of critical interest to corporate management, since the De-
partment has insufficient personnel and funding to challenge all mergers,
and since the majority of those challenged are never consummated, the
guidelines, if adhered to by the Department, have the practical effect
of statutory law.
"The espoused general policy of the Department in enforcing section
7 is the preservation and promotion of "market structures conducive to
competition." 65 Hence the main thrust of the Government's enforce-
ment program is directed not at isolated incidents or anticompetitive
intent, but at acquisitions which alter the elemental composition of the
market. Since there is as yet insufficient evidence to determine the
market effect of the majority of conglomerate mergers, the guidelines
focus on three specific anticompetitive results-mergers involving a
potential entrant, those creating a danger of reciprocal trade; and those
tending to entrench market power in the acquired firm.
Simply stated, the Department will challenge an acquisition by- a
potential entrant of one of the large firms in a highly concentrated
'industry.66 Thus a "toehold" acquisition, i.e. an acquisition, by a poten-
62. Turner, supra note 48. -
63. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
64. 1 CCH TADE REG. REP. 4430 (1968).
65. Id. "
,66. Id. '/. z
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tial entrant, of an insignificant firm for the purpose of establishing an
initial market outpost, is not disfavored. Regarding reciprocal trade, a
merger will be challenged where market conditions in the respective
markets of the two firms would tend to engender the practice, or
where either of the firms have engaged in such conduct in the past.
Moreover, the Department will generally challenge a merger which
would give the merged firm an inordinate absolute size advantage over
the other firms in the acquired corporation's market, or which would
otherwise tend to provide the merged firm with undue market leverage. 8
Discretion is reserved in the Department to challenge other con-
glomerate mergers as evidence of their anticompetitive effects is accumu-
lated.6 The traditional "failing company" doctrine may divert the
Department from challenging an otherwise unlawful acquisition, but it
is clearly provided that this doctrine will apply only where the target
firm is hopelessly insolvent, and hence of no competitive consequence
in its market.70 For the most part, the merger guidelines are a restate-
ment of section 7 decisional law, and as such contribute only nominally
to its clarification.
CONCLUSION
In the vast majority of section 7 controversies, the central question
is the meaning of a "substantial lessening of competition." Unfortu-
nately, the courts and counsel alike have not always been sufficiently
versed in economic principles to apply the statutory criteria to the
facts involved. As a result, the statute has often been used as a blunt
instrument with which to bludgeon to death a merger believed to be
"9not in the public interest." This heavy-handed approach to the
statute has rendered section 7 anathema to corporate growth.
Although the Government and the courts have demonstrated a fear
of industrial concentration, there is no evidence that competition is less
vigorous between the four or five behemoths in a highly concentrated
industry than between the myriads of independent firms in a fragmented
industry. Moreover a concentrated industry is generally a more effi-
cient consumer of resources, owing to centralization of shipping,
manufacturing, and storage facilities, as well as capital savings.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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As respects the conglomerate merger, there is as yet an insufficient
return of data to predict its effect on competition. It appears that such
isolated dangers to competition as possible reciprocal trade agreements
or predatory pricing can best be handled by resort to more specific
statutes. Until more information is available concerning the market
effects of the conglomerate merger, the strictures of a section 7 remedy
demand that it be applied against a conglomerate only where there is
no other means of averting a probable anticompetitive result.
RICHARD B. BLACKWELL
